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I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T 
0 F T H E 
S T A T E 0 F U T A H 
SAM L. KINIRY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,; 
vs. 
LARRY SORENSON and AMERICAN 
HERITAGE BUILDERS, INC. 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16665 
This action sought foreclosure of a chattel 
mortgage, a determination of the amount due on a 
promissory note, and a judgment against the corporate 
defendant, American Heritage Builders, Inc., and the 
individual defendant, the Appellant Larry Sorenson, in 
his individual capacity, in the amount so determined, 
together with interest, costs and a reasonable attorney 
fee. 
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II 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court below granted Plaintiff-Respondent 
a foreclosure of the chattel mortgage, a judgment j oir.tly 
and severally against the corporate defendant and 
against the individual defendant in his personal capaci:y 
for the deficiency in the amount of ELEVEN THOt:SAND SEVE~i 
HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT DOLLARS and 64/100 ($11,648.64), 
and a reasonable attorney fee in the amount of THREE 
THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($3,000.00), together wit~ 
costs and the statutory rate of interest from the date 
of judgment. 
III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirwance of the 
lower court's decision. 
IV 
STATEMEHT OF FACTS 
In December of 1973, the Plaintiff and his 
former spouse purchased a house from the Defendants. 
(t.r. pg. 16, L. 22-24) At the time the terms of said 
purchase were negotiated, the Plaintiff and his wife 
were living in a trailer home which they owned subject 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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to a lien in favor of Cyprus Credit Union. (t.r. pg. 54, 
L. 13-22) They desired to trade their interest in the 
trailer home as a down payment toward the house, and 
the parties agreed to an arrangement whereby the Defendants 
would sell Plaintiff and his wife the house, and Plaintiff 
and his wife would convey to Defendants their interest 
in the trailer home. (t.r. pg. 12, L. 3-13) Plaintiff's 
trailer home was then subject to a mortgage at what the 
parties considered to be a favorable rate of interest. 
Rather than pay off the mortgage, they agreed that 
Plaintiff would continue to make payments on the mortgage 
to Cyprus Credit Union in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-
NINE DOLLARS and N0/100 ($189.00) per month, and that 
Defendants would re-imburse Plaintiff monthly for that 
amount. (t.r. pg. 12, L. 29, 30 and pg. 13, L. 1-19) 
The Defendants executed a promissory note to Plaintiff 
and his wife in the amount of the outstanding indebtedness 
on the trailer home, THIRTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100, 
($13,000.00), payable in the amount of ONE HillU>RED EIGHTY-
NINE DOLLARS and N0/100 ($189.00) per month. (t.r., pg. 
14, L. 5-30, and Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) To secure payment 
of the note in question, the corporate Defendant, American 
Heritage Builders, Inc., granted Plaintiff and his wife 
a chattel mortgage in the trailer home. (Defendant's 
Exhibit 6) 
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Subsequent to the above-described transactions, 
the Plaintiff and his wife were divorced. In an Order 
entered by the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake 
County on August 31, 1976, the Plaintiff was awarded all 
right, title and interest in the promissory note and 
chattel mortgage in question. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) 
By September of 1975, the Defendants had 
defaulted on the promissory note in issue. (t.r. pg. 38, 
L. 14-18) The corporate defendant, though neither dissolved 
nor discharged in bankruptcy, had become financially 
defunct. (t.r. pg. 6, L. 17-30, pg. 7, L. 1-30, pg. 
8, L. 1-2) The Plaintiff demanded repeatedly that the 
Defendants pay the amount owed on the note, and they 
refused to do so. (t.r. pg. 40, L. 11-18, L. 27-30, 
pg. 41, L. 1-10) Finally, on or about September 14, 
1976, the Plaintiff declared the full amount of the note 
to be due and owing, as per the terms of the note, and 
brought the present action to obtain judgment on the note 
and foreclose the chattel mortgage. (r., pg. 2) The 
corporate defendant, American Heritage Builders, Inc., 
defaulted in that action, and a Judgment by Default was 
entered against it. 
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The Court below granted foreclosure of the 
chattel mortgage. A sheriff's sale of the trailer 
home was held on or about January 28, 1977, subsequent 
to the default of the corporate defendant, the mortgagor 
of the chattel mortgage. (r., pg. 107, Finding of Fact 
#9) At said sale, the Plaintiff bid ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS 
and N0/100 ($1,000.00) of his judgment against the 
corporate defendant, and purchased the trailer home. 
The Defendants have been granted a credit against their 
indebtedness for this ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 
($1,000.00). (r., pg. 107, Finding of Fact #9, and 
Conclusion of Law #3) 
The Plaintiff proceeded to trial against the 
individual Defendant in the lower court. After a trial 
held July 17, 1979, the court below awarded Plaintiff 
a judgment jointly and severally against the Defendant 
corporation and against the individual Defendant in his 
personal capacity in the amount of the unpaid indebtedness 
on the promissory note, less the above described credit 
of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($1,000.00) or ELEVEN 
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT DOLLARS and 64/100 
($11,748.64), together with a reasonable attorney fee of 
THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($3,000.00) plus costs 
and interest from the date of judgment. 
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individual Defendant, Larry Sorenson. Parol evidence 
in the form of testimony adduced at trial demonstrates 
that at the time the promissory note in question '.vas 
executed, neither party discussed with the other in 
what capacity the Defendant Sorenson was signing the note. 
(t.r. qg. 29, L. 29-30, pg. 30, L. 1-3 and t.r. pg. 
34, L. 3-6, 27-30, pg. 35 L. 1-3) Other documents 
signed by the parties on the same day as the promissory 
note in question, a Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
(Defendant's Exhibit 3), a Bill of Sale (Defendant's 
Exhibit 5), and a Chattel Mortgage (Defendant's Exhibit 
6), bear varying signatures in that the Defendant 
Sorenson's signatures on the Bill of Sale and Chattel 
Mortgage are unqualified while his signature on the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract is qualified as "Larry 
Sorenson, Pres." (emphasis added) The Appellant 
testified at trial that some payments made on the note 
in issue were made from his personal funds. (t.r. pg. 
21, L. 12-19, pg. 23, L. 9-19) 
From all this evidence, the lower Court could 
and did conclude that the promissory note at issue was 
signed by the Defendant-Appellant in his personal capacity 
and that he is, therefore, personally liable on the note. 
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This finding is supported by the evidence. It is not 
a finding which is clearly against the weight of the 
evidence. It is not a finding where the law has been 
misapplied to established facts. For this reason the 
Court must affirm the judgment below. 
Point II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DEFENDAHT-
APPELLANT SIGNED THE PROMISSORY 
NOTE IN QUESTION IN HIS PERSONAL 
CAPACITY, AND HE IS PERSONALLY 
LIABLE THEREON. 
A. 
THE NOTE IN QUESTION ITSELF MANDATES THAT 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BE HELD LIABLE. 
The promissory note in question (hereinafter, 
the note) appears in the record as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
1. It bears two signature spaces. On one space appear 
the typewritten words "American Heritage Builders, Inc." 
On the other space directly below appears the signature 
of the Defendant-Appellant, Larry Sorenson. Neither 
signature is qualified in any way. The issue before the 
Court is whether the Appellant signed the note in his 
personal capacity, and is therefore personally liable on 
the note, or whether he signed it merely as an agent or 
officer of the Defendant signatory corporation, and is 
therefore not personally liable on the note. 
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The applicable Utah statute in this case is 
U.C.A., ~OA-3-403 (1953), which reads as follows: 
Signature by authorized representative.--
(1) A signature may be made by an 
agent or other representative, and his 
authority to make it may be established 
a~ in other cases of representation. 
No particular form of appointment is 
necessary to establish such authority. 
(2) An authorized representative who 
signs his own name to an instrument 
(a) is personally obligated if the 
instrument neither names the 
person represented nor shows 
that the representative signed 
in a representative capacity; 
(b) except as otherwise established 
between the immediate parties, 
is personally obligated if the 
instrument names the person 
represented but does not show 
that the representative signed in 
a representative capacity, or if 
the instrument does not name 
the person represented but does 
show that the representative 
signed in a representative capacity. 
(3) Except as otherwise established the 
name of an organization preceded or followed 
by the name and off ice of an authorized 
individual is a signature made in a 
representative capacity. 
This statute requires that the Appellant be 
personally bound on the note. Subsection (2)(a) mandates 
that an authorized representative be personally liable 
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on an instrument unless the instrument itself clearly 
indicates he has signed in a representative capacity. 
In the instant case, the Appellant did not qualify his 
signature in any way. The note does not show that ths 
Appellant signed in his capacity as representative of 
the defendant corporation. Appellant is, therefore, 
personally liable on the note. 
Subsection (2)(b) further requires that a 
person be obligated on an instrument unless he shows on 
the instrument that he signed in a representative capacity, 
or unless the parties otherwise agree. Again the Appellant 
must be found personally obligated. The note does not 
show that he signed in a representative capacity, and 
the evidence adduced at trial does not show that the 
parties agreed otherwise. The parties simply did not 
discuss the issue of Appellant's obligation at all. 
(t.r. pg. 29, L. 29-30, pg. 30, L. 1-3 and t.r. pg. 34, 
L. 3-6, 27-30, pg. 35, L. 1-3) 
Subsection (3) provides an easy out for officers 
of a corporation who wish not to be bound personally 
on an instrument. They may sign the instrument with the 
name of the corporation followed by their name and office. 
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In the present case, the Appellant chose not to sign the 
note with his name and office. He chose merely to 
sign with his name. From this the Court should infer 
that the Appellant intended to be personally obligated 
on the note. 
The Court should construe U.C.A., 70A-3-403, 
(1953) strictly against the Defendant-Appellant. The 
statute provides means by which a representative may sign 
an instrument without becoming personally obli8ated, 
and provides that a signer who does not show he is 
signing in a representative capacity will be personally 
abligated on the instrument. The Appellant should not 
now be heard to argue that when he signed the note, however 
he may have signed it, he did not mean to be bound. His 
own self-serving testimony of his intent is not sufficient 
to overcome the dictates of the statute. He has failed 
to heed the provisions of the statute, and it should be 
strictly construed against him. 
Courts in numerous jurisdictions have so 
construed this provision of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
They have held that where an instrument is endorsed as is 
the note in question, where the name of a corporation is 
followed by the unqualified signature of the corporation's 
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authorized representative, both the corporation and 
the representative personally are liable on the instrument. 
Lumberman Associates, Inc. v. Palmer, 344 F. Supp. 1129 
(E.D. Penn., 1972), affd. 485 F.2d 680; Fanning v. Hembree 
Oil Co., 434S.W.2d 822 (Ark., 1968); Norfolk County Trust 
Co. v. Vichensky, 359N.E. 2d 59 (Mass. App., 1977); 
Lanier v. Bank of Virginia, 387 A.2d 614 (Md. App., 1977); 
Rotuba Extruders v. Ceppos, 385 N.E. 2d 1068 (N.Y. App., 
1978); Kroh v. Pronto Petroleum Co., 536 P. 2d 860 (Colo. 
App., 1975); Perez v. Janota, 246 N.E. 2d 42 (Ill. App., 
1969); Seamon v. Acree, 236 S.E. 2d 688 (Ga. App., 1977). 
Such a strict construction of U.C.A., §70A-
3-403, (1953), would also be in keeping with the underlying 
theories of the law of negotiable instruments. The 
purpose of a negotiable instrument is that it may be 
freely negotiated in commerce. The theory is that persons 
ought to be able to trade freely in commercial paper, 
and that such free negotiability of commercial paper is 
essential to our economy. To enhance the unhampered 
exchange of negotiable instruments, a cardinal rule has 
developed that all terms of a negotiable instrument 
must appear clearly on the document. In the words of 
Learned Hand, a negotiable instrument must be "a courier 
without baggage." Specifically, U.C.A., §70A-3-104, (1953), 
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requires that, to be negotiable, a promissory note 
such as the note here in question must be signed by the 
maker. It must show who is bound by the note. 
In the instant case, the Defendants purported 
to make a negotiable instrument payable to the Plaintiff, 
and the Defendant-Appellant personally signed the note 
without indicating on the note that he would not be 
personally bound. It would be incongruous with the above-
described law of negotiable instruments to hold that 
the Defendant-Appellant should not be bound on the note 
when he signed it in an unqualified manner. As noted 
above, all terms of a negotiable instrument must appear 
on the instrument itself, including the name of the 
person to be bound. Holders of negotiable instruments 
should not be made to guess exactly who is liable to 
them on the instrument. This information should be derived 
from the document itself. Where an unqualified signature 
appears on a negotiable instrument, it must be presumed 
that the signer is liable on that instrument. U.C.A., 
§70A-3-403, (1953), must be strictly construed in keeping 
with this policy. The statute must be construed so that 
where an unqualified signature appears on an instrument, 
the signer is personally bound. The Defendant-Appellant 
herein is bound on the note pursuant to a strict construction 
of U.C.A., §70A-3-403, (1953). 
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Finally, the language contained in the body 
of the note supports a finding that both the Appellant 
and the Defendant corporation are bound on the note. 
The note is worded in the plural. It begins, "For 
value received We (sic), the undersigned after date, 
without grace I (or we) promise to pay . II The 
fact that the note is written in the plural indicates 
that at least two seperate persons are liable for payment 
of the note. The only two persons indicated as makers 
and signers of the note are the two Defendants. The 
Defendant-Appellant is thus liable on the note, or the 
note is gramatically incorrect and makes no sense. 
More significantly, the first "we" of the 
above-quoted passage is type-written, and was inserted 
into the language of the note by the note's maker. It 
is not a mere formality of a printed form. The Appellant 
testified at trial that the note was prepared by his 
secretary at his direction and to his specifications. 
(t.r. pg. 4, L. 8-23) The fact that the Appellant himself 
prepared the note and worded it in the plural is strong 
evidence that the Appellant is bound on the note along 
with the Defendant corporation. 
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This Court has recognized that the fact that 
a negotiable instrument is worded in the plural is 
proof that both the corporate maker and the individual 
maker of the instrument are bound. Stanley v. Deseret 
Foods Corp., 74 P.2d 1221 (Utah, 1938). There, the 
Court found, at page 1223, that the phrase "we promise 
to pay" unambiguously indicates that both the corporation 
and the unqualified endorser of a note intended to be 
bound thereon. The wording of the note here in question 
clearly indicates that the Appellant is liable on the 
note. 
B. 
PAROL EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL FURTHER MANDATES 
THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BE HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE ON 
THE NOTE. 
The Court below permitted parol evidence of 
the circumstances surrounding the making of the note to 
be presented at trial. It permitted testimony of all 
parties to this action and of third persons present at the 
time the note was signed. This testimony encompassed 
all aspects of the negotiations surrounding the note and 
the subjective intent of the parties. This parol evidence 
supports the lower court's decision that Appellant is liable 
on the note. 
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Plaintiff's testimony indicates that at the 
time the note was signed he believed the Defendant-
Appellant would be liable on the note. His understanding 
of the whole transaction was simply that Appellant was 
selling his home to Plaintiff and was giving Plaintiff 
his note back as part of the deal. (t.r. pg. 34, L. 27-30, 
pg. 35, L. 1-3, pg. 36, L. 4-30, ·pg. 45, L. 8-11) Further, 
the Appellant himself testified at trial that at no time 
did the parties discuss the personal liability of 
Appellant on the note. They did not explicitly discuss 
this matter at all. (t.r. pg. 29, L. 29-30, pg. 30, L. 1-3) 
However, Appellant did testify that he told Plaintiff all 
along that he was simply selling his home to Plaintiff. 
(t.r. pg. 18, L. 23-30, pg. 19, L. 1-3) In short, the 
parol evidence adduced at trial establishes that the 
parties did not have an oral understanding that Appellant 
would not be liable on the note. The evidence further 
establishes that both parties regarded the transaction 
as Appellant's selling of his home to Plaintiff. This 
understanding of the parties supports the lower court's 
judgment against Appellant. 
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The Appellant testified at trial that he made 
at least one cash payment to Plaintiff on the note, that 
he received a receipt on the cash payment and that the 
funds for some of the payments to Plaintiff on the note 
came from Appellant's personal funds. (t.r. pg. 20, L. 
18-30, pg. 21, L. 1-19, pg. 23, L. 9-30, pg. 24, L. 1-4) 
All this conduct on Appellant's part is inconsistent 
with his claim that he did not intend to be personally 
liable on the note. It is unusual business practice for 
a corporation to make cash payments to its creditors. 
It is even more unusual for a corporation to accept a 
receipt for a cash payment where the receipt is made to 
an individual person. And it is totally inconsistent 
with Appellant's claim of no personal liability on the 
note that he made payments on the note out of his own 
personal funds. All this conduct of Appellant, the cash 
payments, personal receipts, and use of personal funds, 
is more consistent with the payment of a personal debt 
than with the payment of a corporate debt, and supports 
the lower court's finding of personal liability in 
Appellant. 
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The documentary evidence presented below 
indicates that Appellant knew very well how to sign a 
document in his capacity as a corporate agent. The 
Uniform Real Estate Contract signed by the parties 
(Defendant's Exhibit 3) bears Appellant's signature as 
"Larry Sorenson, Pres." If Appellant had wanted to 
sign the note as an agent only, he could have signed as 
he did on the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Appellant has argued that the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract and the note should be construed 
together, inasmuch as they were executed together, and 
that the qualified signature on the contract limits 
Appellant's liability on the note. It would be inappro-
priate to construe these documents together, however. 
The contract is a document conveying title in land. 
The title to the land in question was exlusively in a 
corporation at the time of the sale. (t.r. pg. 15, L. 
7-24) Hence, Appellant could not have signed the contract 
in his personal capacity. His personal signature on the 
document would simply have had no effect. The note, on 
the other hand, represents a debt. The corporate debtor 
in question was a small, family owned entity. (t.r. pg. 
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6, L. 3-16) Unlike a signature on the contract, 
Appellant's personal signature on the note could have 
an effect beyond merely binding the corporate defendant. 
A personal signature there could have the effect of 
obligating Appellant personally on the note. And it 
is likely that an officer of a small, closely held 
corporation will sign for corporate debts in both a 
personal and in an agency capacity in order to encourage 
others to conduct business with the corporation. Hence, 
it is logical to construe the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and the note separately, and to find that the Appellant 
signed one in a representative capacity and the other 
in both representative and personal capacities. The 
manner in which Appellant signed the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract indicates he knew how to sign purely as 
an agent. It is not illogical to construe the contract 
and the note separately. The documentary evidence 
admitted at trial support the findings of the Court below. 
Finally, testimony adduced in the lower Court 
indicates that the Appellant was in a much better bargaining 
position than the Plaintiff with regard to land transactions. 
The Plaintiff testified to having a high school education, 
(t.r. pg. 54, L. 25-27) and to being very ignorant of 
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real estate matters. (t.r. pg. 36, L. 9-15) The Appellant, 
on the other hand, is currently employed as a real estate 
agent. (t.r. pg. 3, L. 25-30, pg. 4, L. 1-7) At the 
time of the land transaction in question he was an 
officer in several corporations conducting business in 
real estate and home contruction. (t.r. pg. 5, L. 20-
29) All the documents prepared in the course of the 
transaction in question were prepared by Appellant. 
(t.r. pg. 4, L. 8-23, pg. 34, L. 11-21) In view of 
the divergent situations of the parties, it would be 
inequitable now to construe the documents in question 
against Plaintiff. The Appellant knew very well what 
he was doing in the course of the land sale at issue 
while Plaintiff never had a clear understanding of the 
process. Appellant drew up the note and its accompanying 
documents and created the ambiguity as to whom is liable 
on the note. Equity requires that that ambiguity now 
be resolved against him. 
c. 
THE CASES CITED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF ARE 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE INSTANT CASE AND DO NOT 
SUPPORT A CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT IS NOT LIABLE ON 
THE NOTE. 
The Appellant has cited the case of First Bank 
and Trust Company v. Post, 12 U.C.C. Reporting Service 512, 
192 N.E.2d 907 (Ill.1973)in support of his claim that he 
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is not liable on the note. That case is easily distinquishable 
from the instant case. First, the promissory note in 
Post was given for purchase of an industrial lathe by 
a corporation from another business entity. There could 
be no mistake there that the transaction involved 
corporate property purchased for corporate use. Here, 
however, the transaction in question involves the sale 
and purchase of a residence. It would be easy and 
logical for Plaintiff here to assume the transaction 
was a personal one. And crucially, in Post all parties 
to the note there in issue testified that they did not 
intend to bind the corporate officers in their personal 
capacity. Here, the Plaintiff has testified that he 
assumed he was dealing personally with the Appellant, 
and both parties have testified they did not discuss the 
matter of Appellant's personal liability. 
The Appellant has also cited Speer v. Friedland, 
12 U.C.C. Reporting Service 509, 276 So.2d 84 (Fla. App., 1973 
in his behalf. In that case, the corporate officer's 
signature was affixed to the check there in question by 
a check signing machine, whereas in the instant case, 
Appellant personally signed the note. (t.r. pg. 4, L. 
22-23) Moreover, in Speer the corporate officer testified 
that she did not intend to be personally bound on the 
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check, and the Plaintiff there produced no evidence to 
rebutt this testimony. Here, there is substantial 
evidence to rebutt Appellant's claim that he did not 
intend to be bound on the note. Finally, in Speer 
as in Post, the holder of the instrument in question 
was clearly dealing with an automobile auctioning concern. 
As noted above, in the present case it was not at all 
clear whether Plaintiff was dealing with a corporation 
or an individual. 
The Appellant also cites J.P. Sivertson & Co. 
v. Lolmaugh, 24 U.C.C. Reporting Service 1212, 380 N.E. 
2d 520 (Ill. App. 1978), for the proposition that parol 
evidence was properly admitted below. The admissability 
of parol evidence below has never been raised by Plaintiff. 
In fact, the parol evidence lends support to Plaintiff's 
claim against Appellant, an noted in Point II B above. In 
addition, Lolmaugh is distinquishable from the present 
case. There, the Court found a prior course of dealings 
between the parties to support the conclusion that the 
corporate officer signed the instrument soley in a 
representative capacity. Here, there is no prior course 
of dealing between the parties to support Appellant's 
theory. 
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The cases cited by Appellant are distinquishable 
from the instant case and do not support Appellant's 
claim that he is not personally liable on the note. 
POINT III 
THE FACT THAT THE MOBILE HOME IN 
QUESTION WAS SOLD AT A SHERIFF'S 
SALE DOES NOT RELIEVE THE DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT' S UNDERLYING OBLIGATION 
ON THE NOTE. 
The Appellant argues in Point II of his brief 
that he is no longer liable on the note because the 
chattel mortgage on the mobile home in question, which 
secured the note, has been foreclosed. He claims that 
the Plaintiff bid ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($1,000.00) 
of his judgment against the corporate defendant at 
the sheriff's sale and recovered the mobile home. He 
further claims that the Plaintiff resold the mobile 
home for THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 ($3,000.00) 
profit above what was owed to the Cypres Credit Union 
on the mobile home, and that therefore the note should 
be deemed satisfied and the Appellant should be relieved 
of his obligation on the note. Appellant cites in 
support of this claim the case of Dulio v. Senechal, 
7 U.C.C. Reporting Service 222, (Mass. App. 1969). 
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The Dulio case is not applicable in the 
instant situation. The facts of that case are wholly 
different from the facts now before the Court. In Dulio, 
X sold Y a used car and Y gave X his personal check for 
$500.00 as payment for the car. The check did not clear 
the bank. Y returned the used car to x. The Court in 
Dulio held that X was not entitled to collect on the 
check in addition to recovering the car. There was no 
promissory note or security interest involved in Dulio 
and the whole transaction took place in a matter of days. 
Here, Appellant did not merely give a check 
to Plaintiff and take Plaintiff's mobile home in exchange. 
There was a complex transaction involved in which 
Appellant sold Plaintiff his house on contract, took 
Plaintiff's trailer home and gave Plaintiff his promissory 
note for $13,000 and a chattel mortgage on the mobile home. 
A third party held a mortgage on the mobile home and 
Plaintiff was to continue paying that third party for 
a period of years while receiving payments on the note 
for a period of years from Appellant and paying Appellant 
on the Uniform Real Estate Contract for a period of years. 
To compare the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage here in 
issue with the simple purchase and return of goods in 
Dulio is absurd. 
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Appellant cites the Restatement of Restitution 
in support of his claim. However, Plaintiff here has 
not sued in equity for restitution. He has sued in law 
on a note and for enforcement of a contract. The 
Restatement of Restitution is simply not applicable. 
Appellant would have the Court believe that 
Plaintiff is estopped from pursuing his remedy on the 
note merely because he foreclosed a mortgage securing 
the note and obtained a ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR ($1,000.00) 
recovery at the foreclosure sale. Appellant has not 
ever contended that ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and N0/100 
($1,000.00) was an unjust or unreasonable price to bid 
at the sheriff's sale of the mobile home. He has 
offered no proof that this amount was unreasonable. 
And unless that price itself was unreasonable, it is 
the only amount which should be considered in determining 
how much credit Appellant is entitled to toward the 
judgment against him. The Court should not look at 
events which occurred after the sheriff's sale to see 
if Plaintiff later managed to make a good bargain on the 
mobile home. In the absence of pleading and proof that 
the price bid was unreasonable, the Court should treat 
this case as though astrangerhad bought the mobile home 
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for $1,000.00 at the sheriff's sale. The Plaintiff would 
be entitled to the $1,000.00 bid, the Appellant would 
be entitled to a credit for that amount, and what the 
stranger did with the mobile home later would have no 
effect on the present case. What Plaintiff did here with 
the mobile home after the sheriff's sale has no effect 
on the present case involving liability on the note. 
Appellant further seems to argue that after 
Plaintiff bought the mobile home at the sheriff's sale, 
he was put in as good a condition as he would have been 
had Appellant paid on the note, and that this should 
bar Plaintiff from further recovery. However, Plaintiff 
is not now in as good a position as he would have been 
had Appellant honored his obligation on the note. Testimony 
presented at trial by both parties indicates Appellant 
defaulted on the note as early as September of 1975, (t.r. 
pg. 38, L. 14-18) and certainly by June of 1976. (t.r. 
pg. 23, L. 1-11) Yet Plaintiff did not buy the trailer 
home at the auction sale until January of 1977. As noted 
in the Statement of Facts above, each month the Appellant 
failed to pay the Plaintiff on the note, the Plaintiff 
nevertheless had to pay his credit union $189.00 as 
payment on the mobile home. From September, 1975 until 
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January, 1977 the Plaintiff paid his creditor for a mobile 
home he no longer owned and built equity in that mobile 
home for Appellant. It is true the Plaintiff recovered 
the mobile home at auction sale in January, 1977, and it 
is true he later sold the home for enough to pay off 
Cyprus Credit Union's mortgage on the trailer home. 
However, the amount he had to pay to clear the mortgage 
to Cyprus Credit Union had already been greatly reduced 
by payments he had made (payments the Appellant should 
have made) from September, 1975 to January, 1977. If 
Appellant had performed on his note as he should have, 
Plaintiff would never have had to make those out-of-
pocket payments. Moreover, Plaintiff is entitled to 
interest for the payments on which Appellant defaulted. 
And the Plaintiff has suffered much expense and 
aggrivation in being forced to take Appellant to court 
to recover on the note and the chattel mortgage in question. 
Clearly, the sheriff's sale of the trailer home has not 
put Plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been 
in had Appellant performed on the note. 
The mere fact that Plaintiff was able to recover 
his interest in the mobile home for ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS and 
N0/100 ($1,000.00) after a suit and foreclosure does not 
relieve Appellant of his liability on the note. The chattel 
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mortgage provides that Plaintiff may recover a deficiency 
judgment on the note for any amount not recovered at the 
sale of the collateral, and the lower Court's judgment 
should stand. 
v 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should not reverse the decision of 
the lower Court unless that decision is clearly against 
the weight of the evidence. Appellant has neither 
pleaded nor proved that the decision below was against 
the weight of the evidence, and the evidence below 
supports the lower Court's findings. The judgment 
below must be affirmed. 
A review of the evidence adduced at trial 
demonstrates that Appellant is personally liable on 
the note. First, an analysis of the note itself shows 
that Appellant is personally liable. It bears the 
Appellant's unqualified signature. U.C.A., §70-3-403, 
(1953), establishes that where an authorized representative 
of a corporation signs an instrument without indicating 
he is signing in a representative capacity, he is personally 
bound on the instrument. The weight of case law and the 
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underlying policy of negotiable instruments demand that 
this statute be strictly construed against Appellant. 
Also, the plural wording of the note requires a finding 
that Appellant is obligated on the note along with the 
defendant corporation. 
Parol evidence admitted below supports the 
lower Court's judgment that Appellant is liable. The 
evidence shows no agreement to the contrary between the 
parties and shows that Plaintiff believed Appellant would 
be personally liable. Appellant's conduct in making cash 
payments on the note out of his personal funds and in 
accepting personal receipts back for these payments supports 
a finding of Appellant's personal liability. 
The documentary evidence presented below 
also supports the lower Court's ruling. It indicates 
that Appellant knew how to sign the note in a representative 
capacity if he wanted to. Appellant's argument that the 
documents should be construed together is erroneous, due 
to the differing nature of the documents. 
Testimony below demonstrates the unequal bargaining 
position of the parties and Appellant's responsibility 
for preparing the documents in issue. Any ambiguity in 
those documents should be resolved against Appellant. 
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Appellant cites several cases in support of 
his claim that he is not personally liable on the 
note. All these cases can be distinguished from the 
instant case. None of them requires the reversal of the 
Court below. 
The Appellant claims that Plaintiff should not 
recover on the note because he already recovered his 
interest in the mobile home by bidding on his judgment 
at the sheriff's sale. Appellant is entitled only to 
$1,000.00 credit toward his debts for the amount bid at 
the sale. He has not demonstrated that $1,000.00 was 
an unreasonable amount to bid at the sale, and in the 
absence of unreasonableness the Court should not consider 
whether Plaintiff ultimately made a good bargain on the 
mobile home. The Court should treat the auction as 
though a stranger bid $1,000.00 on the collateral. Moreover, 
Plaintiff has not yet been put in as good a position as 
he would have been in had Appellant not defaulted on 
the note. The chattel morteage in issue permits 
recovery of any dificiency on the note after the mortgage 
is foreclosed. 
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The decision of the Court below that App2l1ant 
is personally liable to Plaintiff for the deficiency 
on the note should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~.::?SR~D"'-'9""-.-.........,,~..-,, 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to C. Glenn 
Robertson, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Larry 
Sorenson, 9455 Peruvian Drive, Sandy, Utah 84070, 
postage prepaid in the United States Postal Serivice 
the ::?'7~day of February, 1980. ~&~ ,c::' 
BRIAN M. BARNARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
